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A substantial portion of public policy is created, implemented, and
adjudicated through small groups of elective and appointive officials
occupying various institutional roles in the United States. A thorough
understanding of the decision-making process is crucial if we are to
comprehend policy-making and resultant policy outcomes. Small group
decision-making bodies characterize local, state, and national political
systems in both domestic and foreign policy arenas. Yet the small group
process and the social-psychological mechanisms influencing individual and
collective choice resulting from that process are consideiably under-investi-
gated in the examination of policy systems.
Our purpose is to explicate a theoretical framework which specifically
addresses microanalytic components of the process of political decision-
making. Although an extensive and critical review of the epistemological,
practical, and theoretical problems of decision-making and the literature
relevant to them has already been addressed in some detail elsewhere
(Kirkpatrick, 1975a; 1975c), our approach to decision-making is guided by
a number of general assumptions. These include the premise that
social-psychological concepts used in political science have enjoyed little
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direct application to the study of decision-making; that political science
decision-making students have generally avoided social-psychological con-
cepts beyond early works; that psychologists interested in decision-making
are more akin to their &dquo;rational man&dquo; economic colleagues than to social
psychologists; and that relevant social psychologists most familiar with
useful concepts have generally avoided the topic of decision-making. These
premises are complemented by an unproductive tendency to study
decision-making as a series of discrete units of behavior (see Scioli et al.,
1971). Furthermore, political scientists have not systematically linked
psychological and environmental variables, and research tends to empha-
size either the organization, the decision-maker, or the decisional outcome.
DECISION PROCESS COMPONENTS:
ALTERNATIVE SEARCH AND CHOICE SHIFT
The most fundamental subprocesses of decision-making include the
search for alternatives and the shifting of choices dependent upon the
assessment of consequences. A nagging difficulty for political decision-
making scholars has been the problem of theoretically linking decisional
processes and outcomes or policy decisions. While recognizing that
decision-making involves some set of functional behaviors (e.g., problem
recognition, alternative generation, bargaining), decision-making theorists
have generally been unable to develop testable and specific propositions
concerning the impact of decisional processes on final choices.
The above problem appears to result from an unnecessary dichotomiza-
tion of the analytical possibilities available for explaining decisions.
Traditionally, the approaches open to the analyst appear to be between
those which promise theoretical generality for explaining decisional
outcomes at the cost of obscuring decisional processes, and approaches
which are rich in process analysis, but idiosyncratic or illusory in terms of
explaining outcomes. Examples of the first set of approaches include many
attempts to explain decisions in terms of rational choice wherein a variety
of process factors are either ignored or &dquo;assumed away&dquo; (Arrow, 1963;
Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordershook, 1973; see review by Hofferbert,
1972). Examples of the second set of approaches include historical case
analyses of specific decisions (Snyder et al., 1962; for discussion see Roig,
1973; Robinson and Majak, 1967), and an array of social-psychological
models which exclude outcomes (see reviews by Kirkpatrick, 1975c, and
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Holsti, 1976). Decision-making scholars need not be limited to choices
within this traditional dichotomy, especially with respect to the analysis of
political decision-making by small groups.
The following discussion is based on the assumptions that politics
essentially involves communication phenomena and that communication
in decision-making is fundamentally concerned with reducing uncertainty
on the part of the decision-makers (Dyson et al., 1972; Davis, 1974a,
Deutsch, 1966; Milbrath, 1963). Using this general framework, which is
further explained below, it is possible to link conceptually decisional
processes and outcomes. One main argument is that the way in which
decisional groups go about reducing uncertainty determines, in part, the
propensity of groups for policy shifts.
SEARCH BEHAVIOR AND INFORMATION PROCESSING
Social-psychological concepts which serve as potential alternatives for
more traditional (as well as behavioral) nonprocess approaches in political
science and rational calculus interpretations in economics are not highly
developed in a decision context. However, there is a general body of
theory which establishes a foundation for social-psychological integra-
tion-cognitive process approaches. It is a broad field which reflects
concern for how information is processed, the search for alternatives, the
organization of cognitive components, perception of others, and the
definition of the situation within which decision-making occurs. Although
its utility and origins have been traced elsewhere (Holsti, 1976; Kirkpat-
rick, 1975c), its cognitive and perceptual emphasis is most noted in the
fields of organizational behavior and foreign policy decision-making. It is
indebted to the early work of Herbert Simon and his &dquo;Carnegie School,&dquo;
which placed a unique emphasis on information processing and constraints
on rational choice-knowledge of consequences was seen as fragmentary
and incomplete, perception of alternatives as limited, and values attached
to consequences in the future as only imperfectly anticipated (Simon,
1957: 81-83; 1958; also see Storing, 1962). In work with March (1958),
Simon offered a critique of the traditional administrative science
approach by emphasizing the incomplete and inaccurate motivational
assumptions (e.g., monetary reward) underlying previous theory, and the
importance of constraints and cognition in the search process-&dquo;a theory
of choice without a theory of search is inadequate&dquo; (March and Simon,
1958: 174).
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In summary, the information-processing school emphasizes the impor-
tance of previous information, the complexity and volume of new
information, the role of existing belief systems, levels of cognitive
complexity, the search process, selective responsiveness, and perceptual
distortion. Most research utilizing these concepts in political science,
however, has been limited to work on mass publics, especially public
participation and electoral behavior. Indeed, its research utility has been
confined to forms of inquiry which pay scant attention to the process of
decision-making, to institutional settings, or to small groups. The following
framework emphasizes search behavior and information processing with
roots in this tradition.
Decision-making is generally characterized by choice behavior. As such,
it is necessarily information-dependent. Because decision-makers cannot
know everything relevant to deciding, it is necessary for them to seek
information in order to reduce as much uncertainty as possible and
thereby minimize the possibilities for error. Alternatively, certain condi-
tions may lead to the avoidance of information or to a selective search in
order to reduce cognitive tension or reinforce existing beliefs. Decision-
makers need information on the nature of the problem being considered,
the problem environment, the nature and consequences of alternative
actions, and feedback from previous decisions on the problem or related
problems (Skjei, 1973). The quality of decisions largely hinges on the
ability of decision-makers to obtain and process this information.
Additionally, given the fact that political decision-making generally
involves open solution sets (i.e., does not involve the discovery of a single
correct analogarithm), decision-makers need information from one another
concerning the possible bases for bargaining, negotiation, and compromise
(Dyson et al., 1972; Kelley and Thibaut, 1968). Therefore, in a
fundamental sense, most decision-related behavior prior to the decision
itself involves attempts by decision-makers to remove uncertainty through
communication with each other and with actors outside the decisional
group. This contention is hardly novel, yet discussions of information
search behavior by decision-makers comprises a rather small portion of the
decision-making literature.
Constraints on Uncertainty Reduction
in Decision-Making
The search for information in order to solve a problem or research a
decision is not costless. As Downs (1967: 3) observes:
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Information is costly because it takes time, effort, and sometimes money to
obtain data and comprehend their meaning. Decision-makers have only limited
capabilities regarding the amount of time they can spend making decisions, the
number of issues they can consider simultaneously, and the amount of data
they can absorb regarding any one problem.
Consequently, it is impossible for any decision-making group to remove all
uncertainty surrounding any particular decision. This assertion raises the
theoretical issue of specifying the relationships between particular types of
constraints on decision-makers, including psychological ones, and the
kinds and amount of information sought or avoided during decisional
processes.
Information constraints. One set of constraints on decision-makers is, as
Downs suggests, the cost of obtaining information. Theorists approaching
the problem from this perspective have generally taken the position that
decision-makers utilize some sort of cost-benefit criteria during the
information search phase (Downs, 1967; Skjei, 1973). The view is that
decision-makers cease acquiring information when the cost of acquiring an
additional unit of information exceeds the benefits to be gained by the
reduction of uncertainty associated with the unit of information. Such an
&dquo;economy of information theory,&dquo; however, is severely limited as a
descriptive theory of information search in decision-making. Like other
theories of behavior based on the assumption of individual rationality,
information economy theory rests on some very problematical premises
(Conrad, 1970). Moreover, when applied to decision-making groups, these
problems are compounded-given the fact that political decisions are
seldom made by individuals in isolation but rather in the context of
internal organizational groups and external (constituents, clienteles)
reference groups. As Olson (1971: 22-36) has demonstrated, groups
usually cannot obtain optimal levels of any collective good unless all
members of the group place equal value on the good in question.
Accordingly, because there is no reason to assume that members of any
particular decision-making group will place the same value on the
acquisition of information, it is doubtful that the group will acquire an
optimal level of information. Nevertheless, cost is a very real constraint on
decision-makers’ ability to remove uncertainty. This includes not only
time and other resources, but also sunk costs or psychological commit-
ments to previous information and policy (Wilensky, 1967: 78).
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Organizational constraints. Organizational routines also impose limita-
tions on the search for information. First suggested by Simon (1957), this
view holds that standard organizational procedures and communication
patterns largely predetermine the type and quantity of information
acquired by decision-makers. Cyert and March (1963) offer ample
evidence for this contention in their case studies of industrial decision-
makers. Allison (1971) also demonstrates the viability of this model of
information search in his analysis of the Cuban missile crisis. Apparently,
standard administrative procedures serve a significant channeling function
with respect to organizational decision-making (Feldman and Kanter,
1965).
Situational constraints. Situations also condition search behavior.
Hermann (1969), for example, suggests that consideration of alternatives is
constrained in crisis decision-making (see Holsti and George, 1975).
Presumably, decision-makers are more easily overloaded (i.e., reach
information-processing capacity) in crisis situations than in noncrisis
situations and, consequently, tend to limit search activity during stress.
This contention is supported by a large volume of social-psychological
research on stress (Janis, 1971). The more general conceptualization of
Snyder and his associates (1962) posits that search behavior in decision-
making is determined by the initial definition of the situation by
decision-makers. Unfortunately, their framework is so complex that it has
been severely criticized as a useful model (McCloskey, 1956; Rosenau,
1967). Others, however, have used the definition of the situation notion to
good advantage in frameworks which are less global and awkward (Pruitt,
1965 ).
Motive constraints. It is likely that search behavior is partially guided
by motives or affective needs of the decision-maker, in much the same way
as theorists link opinion formation and change to the functional requisites
of the individual (Smith et al., 1956; Katz, 1960; Lane, 1959; see
discussion by Kirkpatrick and Pettit, 1972: 267-270). The comprehensive-
ness, complexity, and selectivity of information search behavior may be
dependent upon individual functional needs, such as object appraisal
(understanding and controlling events), social adjustment (affiliative
needs), or ego defense (the projection of intrapsychic tension). Similarly,
Nimmo (1974) suggests that types of political imagery will reflect
expressive, evaluative, and instrumental goals or motives (also see Wilker
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and Milbrath, 1970). In decision-specific terms, for example, Katz and
Kahn (1966) suggest that decision-makers project their own internal
feelings onto others and perceive that others’ attitudes are congruent,
thereby reducing the need to collect new information. In general, there is a
relationship between the type of needs fulfilled by holding certain beliefs
and the type of influence that information and significant others have on
the decision-maker, e.g., existing beliefs that perform an object appraisal
function are likely to be influenced by new information, whereas those
based on social adjustment needs are more likely to be influenced by
reference group identifications (Smith, 1968; Schoettle, 1968).
A more extensive literature on personality attributes is firmly rooted in
need, motivation, and function concepts (see Kirkpatrick and Pettit,
1972). Several components of this research tradition bear on the
alternative choice process: (1) Motives are states of tension caused by
unsatisfied needs which trigger decision-making behavior (Argyris, 1957;
Brim et al., 1962; Scott, 1967; Hersey and Blanchard, 1967). (2) Low
self-esteem, psychic deprivation, inflexibility, and over-conformity are
associated with inhibited information seeking in the context of allaying
anxiety and supporting needs (Knutson, 1972). (3) Dogmatic and
authoritarian personalities may obstruct decisions, limit the impact of new
information, lead to decisions which merely justify existing beliefs, and
demand subservience that makes it risky for others to offer negative or
unpleasant information about alternatives (Bensman and Rosenberg, 1960;
also see Lasswell, 1954; Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967). (4) After one
progresses up the need hierarchy (when basic needs are met) to
higher-order needs (e.g., self-actualization), we can begin to speak of
decision-making flexibility, competent problem-solving, tolerance, and the
realistic assessment of alternatives (Argyris, 1957; Knutson, 1972). (5)
High levels of ego involvement are associated with goal-setting behavior
(Sherif and Cantril, 1947), task performance and high levels of aspiration
(Ferguson, 1962), and fewer categories for classifying statements of
alternatives (LaFave and Sherif, 1968). (6) Flexibility in the adjustment of
levels of aspiration bears directly on the search process and is influenced
by the availability of bland alternatives (March and Simon, 1958; Siegel,
1957; Siegel and Fouraker, 1960).
While the personality theory school in both political science and
psychology is massive and complex, we have chosen to focus on a selected
subset of attribute and motive qualities which may bear directly on the
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search process (for reviews, see Kirkpatrick, 1975c: 76-79; Kirkpatrick and
Pettit, 1972: 16-72).
Cognitive constraints. In addition to motives or functional needs, there
is a variety of cognitive limitations imposed on the uncertainty and tension
reduction process. While informational, organizational, and situational
constraints tend to emphasize environmentally determined influences,
affective and cognitive limitations originate from the decision-maker.
Indeed, the prevailing view of &dquo;intended rationality&dquo; which often underlies
the Camegie School gives conceptual priority to environmental or
stimulus-determined forces, whereas affective and cognitive limitations
may be viewed as individual or perceiver-determined (for a review of these
alternative conceptualizations in the study of political perception, see
Kirkpatrick and Pettit, 1972: 199-267; also see Sigel, 1964; Nimmo and
Savage, 1971). A point of general agreement among cognitive psycholo-
gists is that all acts of cognition are essentially constructive in nature. That
is, we create perceptions of our environment rather than directly reflecting
stimuli as a mirror reflects a physical image: &dquo;seeing, hearing, and
remembering are all acts of construction, which may make more or less use
of stimulus information depending on the circumstances&dquo; (Neisser, 1966:
10).
Because decision-makers can only attend to a limited amount of
information, they necessarily utilize a variety of conceptual rules to
simplify decisional parameters. Newell et al. (1958) refer to these &dquo;rules of
thumb&dquo; as heuristics. A common type of heuristic is analogy. Using
analogy, decision-makers look for similarities between the problem they
wish to solve and other problems they have solved in the past. Wildavsky
(1964) and Fenno (1966) have both observed the frequent reliance on
heuristics in congressional committee decision-making. Additionally, the
work of Wildavsky (1964: 47-55) at the national government level and
Schick (1971: 164-191) at the state governmental level suggests that
different simplifying rules are associated with different roles in the
budgetary process. For example, legislative committees concerned with
authorization measures appear to search for different information from
executive agencies than committees concerned with appropriation deci-
sions.
Research by Schroeder et al. (1967), Shapiro and Bonham (1973), and
Bien (1955) indicates that the conceptual complexity of decision-makers’
cognitive structures also influences information search. The experimental
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and simulation studies of these investigators indicate that decision-making
groups composed of cognitively complex decision-makers have a greater
ability to process information than groups composed of members with
moderate to low levels of cognitive complexity. Similarly, complex
cognitive structures are associated with heightened search activity (Nidorf
and Crockett, 1964) and less dependence on social influence (Bieri, 1955).
Continued efforts along the lines suggested by these research efforts
appear to promise considerable insight into the process/outcome problem
in decision-making theory and research.
In addition to cognitive complexity, dissonance theory suggests that
conflict between alternatives and/or significant others creates tension to
reduce it through a variety of mechanisms which are relevant to the search
process. These include nondecision or avoidance of alternatives which
increase tension, changes in existing cognition, or the development of new
cognitions, information, or alternatives (Festinger, 1964). The latter effect
is especially dependent upon the nature and credibility of information
sources, and it is likely to be the stage which produces divergence in the
attractiveness of alternatives through the search for supportive information
or the avoidance of discrepant information (for a discussion of predeci-
sional stress, see Holsti and George, 1975: 264).
Group constraints. Finally, a variety of variables associated with
decision-making groups themselves appear to constrain the ability of
decision-makers to reduce uncertainty, thereby affecting the search
process. Decision-making in a group context involves more than the sum of
individual judgments-it leads to changes in problem solutions affected by
social influence, conformity, and feelings of community. The group
context and its underlying processes affect (1) the speed and accuracy of
responses to stimuli, perceptual processes, infoimation dependence, and
the cognitive processes of conceptualizing, relating, and reasoning (see
Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Zajonc, 1965); (2) receptivity of information
and the multiplicity of alternatives examined (see Kelley and Thibaut,
1968); and (3) the number and creativity of alternatives (Osborn, 1957).
Group cohesion and conformity tendencies appear to be important in
this regard. A prominent political study in this vein is Janis’ (1972) study
of several foreign policy &dquo;fiascos.&dquo; Janis theorizes that cohesion and
conformity tendencies present in all small group situations tend to result
in what he terms &dquo;groupthink,&dquo; which involves limited search behavior by
decision-makers and a concomitant inability or failure to correct initial
estimate errors. Janis’ conclusions about the foreign policy fiascos he
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studied are based on historical anecdotal evidence, but the general
proposition that group processes may inhibit accurate assessment of
decisional issues is buttressed by an extensive collection of experimental
evidence from laboratory studies of group problem solving processes
(Cartwright, 1968).
The nature of group leadership also has important implications for the
uncertainty reduction behavior of groups. Numerous field and laboratory
studies have demonstrated that leader characteristics and leadership style
are major determinants of group task performance (Stogdill, 1974:
363-407). Given the fact that task performance partly hinges on the
accurate assessment of task requirements and resources, it logically follows
that leaders influence the search for information (Maier and Solem, 1952;
Osborn, 1957; Taylor et al. 1958). Support for this argument is implied by
Janis’ work cited above. Common to all the foreign policy decisions
studied by Janis, was the presence of a single definite group leader, usually
the head of state. It may be that the limited search behavior of these
groups was partially the result of single-leader dominance. Additional
evidence for this hypothesis is provided by the the observance of
committee chairman dominance over committee deliberations in congres-
sional settings (Fenno, 1966).
In addition, the search for information in groups is partly determined
by the level of consensus in groups. If group members are in total accord
with respect to decisional issues, then there is little need to seek
information for purposes of bargaining and negotiation. Alternatively, if
group members are in disagreement over preferences and/or instrumental-
ities, then they need to acquire information in order to resolve these
differences (Kelley and Thibaut, 1968). This is clearly not an exhaustive
list of group characteristic variables, but those mentioned illustrate the
potential group influences on uncertainty reduction by decision-making
groups.
In summary, decision-makers need information in order to reach a
decision, but their ability to obtain and process enough information to
reduce uncertainty is constrained by the costs associated with obtaining
information, their cognitive capacities and functional needs, situational
and organizational conditions, and by a variety of group-specific character-
istics. In order to link decisional processes and outcomes, it is therefore
necessary to determine the linkages between these constraints, the types
and amounts of information sought by groups, and final decisional
outcomes.
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Information Types
An initial step in investigating information search behavior requires the
establishment of a taxonomy of information (see Jeffers et al., 1976), as
some kinds of information are more important at various stages of
decision-making than others and some kinds are more readily available to
decision-makers (i.e., their ability to obtain it is less constrained). One
useful typology is provided by Skjei (1973: 9-46), who suggests that there
are four types of relevant decision information: (1) problem information;
(2) problem environment information; (3) alternatives information; and
(4) feedback information. Problem information concerns the development
of basic objectives, analysis of needs, and the development of decisional
standards; it therefore involves a programmatic focus. Problem environ-
ment information relates to the various factors over which decision-makers
have little or no control, but which will influence the implementation of
their decision. Included among such factors are basic resources, population
characteristics and trends, and legal constraints. Alternatives information
involves various means-ends analysis; or the development of alternatives
and comparisons of the benefits and costs associated with each alternative.
Feedback information refers to the review of past decisions on the
problem or related problems.
Furthermore, we may conceptualize information search across substan-
tive types in three general ways. First, level of information can be defined
in terms of the sheer volume of information sought, regardless of content.
Second, it is differentiated by the diversity of types, or the extent to
which various types of information are gathered by decision-makers.
Finally, level of search may be described in terms of the diversity within
types, or the extent to which different information content within the
general types is sought.
A final distinction between information types concerns the difference
between intemally and externally generated information. In any given
decision-making group, individuals will have varying degrees of informa-
tion about any particular problem under consideration. This may be due
to differential experience with the problem or varying ability to integrate
problem information with past experience or stored information. In either
case, we may assume that some decisions, as well as individual character-
istics, require that decision-makers rely more heavily on external informa-
tion than internal information or vice versa. In studying information
search behavior, therefore, we must be aware of both internally and
externally oriented search.
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Political Science Research
on the Search Process
Given the importance of information search in decision-making, it is
curious that few political scientists have specifically addressed it in their
research. In a recent effort to assess our knowledge of the search process,
Davis (1974a) was able to catalog only a few nonhistorical empirical
treatments. A sociologist, Harold Wilensky, reached a similar conclusion in
his investigation of the generation and use of &dquo;intelligence&dquo; in govern-
mental and nongovernmental organizations: &dquo;It is strange that social
scientists, who are by profession devoted to the application of reason to
man’s affairs, have been more impressed by the use and misuse of power
than by the use and misuse of knowledge&dquo; (Wilensky, 1967: 7).
Unfortunately, Wilensky’s own investigation does not fill the substantial
theoretical gap in decision-making research. His arguments refer to
organizations generally, rather than to decision-making groups; his data are
historical/anecdotal; and, therefore, his generalizations are necessarily
limited. Similarly, the foreign policy decision-making literature which
raises questions of the search process (see Holsti, 1976), is also limited by
theoretical focus and data sources. The work of Fenno (1966), Wildavsky
(1964), and Huitt (1957) is also suggestive with respect to the search
process in congressional committees, but again search is not a major focus
for them, their conceptualization is very general, and their data are
anecdotal. Janis (1972) and Allison (1971) probably come closest to
specifically addressing the search for alternatives by decision-makers. Janis,
however, is rather vague with regard to search and Allison’s work, though
very explicit conceptually, is a case study. Furthermore, both Janis and
Allison address peculiar types of decisions, i.e., foreign policy decisions
under crisis conditions.
A recent study by Skjei (1973) specifically addresses the question of
information generation for political decision-making. His focus, however,
is the impact of various kinds of information presented to decision-makers
on final choices. Skjei raises the issue of the nature of information
necessary to &dquo;control&dquo; decision-making in terms of collective payoff for
society. This systemic approach to search processes and the fact that he
tests propositions with case study data concerning the decentralization of
New York City schools, limit the usefulness of the study as a guide to
small decision-making groups. Skjei is singular, however, in his endeavors
to treat theoretically types of decision-relevant information and in his
speculation concerning the nature of groups external to decision-makers
which are likely to generate these various kinds of information.
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There have been a few experimental and simulation investigations of
decision-making in which search has been a major dependent variable. In
Hermann’s simulation of foreign policy decision-making by small groups
under crisis conditions, the author found moderate support for the
hypothesis that search for alternatives is more constrained under crisis
conditions than noncrisis situations (Hermann, 1969: ch. 7). In their
simulation of the Jordanian crisis of 1970, Shapiro and Bonham (1973)
found that search for decisional information increased as the cognitive
complexity of decision-makers increased. This finding is specific to
individuals rather than to groups. In an experimental investigation of
budgetary decision-making, Davis (1974a; 1974b; 1976) confirmed the
findings of Shapiro and Bonham with respect to internal search within
decision-making groups (i.e., the exchange of information between group
members of purposes of reducing uncertainty). In the Davis study,
cognitive complexity of decision-makers did not appear to affect the
degree of external search for information (i.e., request for information
from sources outside the group). Davis also found that internal informa-
tion search became more constrained in groups with single dominant
leaders as the time for decision narrowed. Although he did not engage in
hypothesis-testing with respect to search processes in decision-making
groups, Barber’s (1966) laboratory study of Boards of Finance in
Connecticut illustrates the use of a variety of heuristic or simplifying rules
in budgetary decision-making. Barber’s detailed observations indicated that
such groups utilize several criteria for simplification in budgeting:
controllability, size and increase, concreteness, immediacy, uncertainty,
and dollars and costs (pp. 33-47).
In summary, the need for systematic hypothesis-testing concerning
search processes in political decision-making is apparent. Political scientists
have tended to avoid the problem and existing research is mostly
descriptive. Developing political decision-making theory and closing the
process/outcome gap in existing theory will require greater effort to test
theoretically derived propositions in a way which allows for generaliza-
tions beyond rather narrow cases.
CHOICE SHIFTS AND GROUP DECISION-MAKING
A major component of the decision-making process in addition to
search behavior is the process of arriving at final choices following
alternative enumeration and the assessment of consequences. Since a
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considerable portion of political decision-making occurs in small groups, a
necessary function of any decision theory is to explain the effects of group
processes on the outcome-the decision itself. How does a set of individual
beliefs become transformed into a group decision, and how does that
decisional result differ from the original beliefs of the participants? There
is a substantial body of social-psychological theory which addresses this
individual-group transformation, the changes and shifts relevant to final
outcomes, and the various individual and group characteristics which
influence the process.
The Risky Shift
One major category of social-psychological research addresses the
&dquo;risky shift&dquo; hypothesis (for a review, see Kirkpatrick, 1975b; 1975c).
Conventional political wisdom supports a rather slow and conservative
decision process in groups; Whyte’s (1956) &dquo;organization man,&dquo; Presthus’
(1962) &dquo;indifferent,&dquo; Peter’s (Hull and Peter, 1969) &dquo;principle,&dquo; and
Kaufman’s (1973) &dquo;decidophobia&dquo; pervade even the most popular
literature on groups, decisions, and contemporary society. Yet &dquo;risky
shift&dquo; research has found that group decisions are more risky than
individual decisions. This conflict between two general schools of theory
and research exemplifies the need for more systematic attention to the
subject.
The central question of the &dquo;risky shift&dquo; literature has inquired as to
whether groups make riskier decisions than individuals. In the only
comprehensive book on the subject, Kogan and Wallach (1964: 1) justify
the use of the risk hypothesis for decision-making:
Decision-making .. involves the weighing of alternatives in terms of their
desirabilities and their likelihoods ... issues concerning the avoidance or
acceptance of risks in arriving at decisions hence are likely to be important
ingredients in thinking processes.
In order to evaluate properly the &dquo;risky shift&dquo; hypothesis, a brief review of
the methods and models employed to explain the hypothesis is necessary.
Finally, the evolution of the risk conceptualization to a more general
choice-shift formulation, and its applicability to political decision-making
analysis is outlined.
Most research on the risky shift evolved from a single &dquo;Choice Dilemma
Questionnaire&dquo; (CDQ), first constructed by Kogan and Wallach in 1959 to
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measure sex differences (Wallach and Kogan, 1959: 554-564) and
subsequently applied to risk-taking behavior in groups by Stoner (1961).
The CDQ is a series of hypothetical life situations where the subjects are
asked to advise the decision-maker in each situation. Each item is built in
such a manner that one alternative is a risky choice with a potential for
failure, while the other choice is a cautious one urging the individual to
remain in his/her present life situation (for a complete list of the CDQ
items, see Kogan and Wallach, 1964: Appendix E). The shift has most
commonly been referred to as the &dquo;risky shift&dquo; phenomenon because of
the tendency to shift in the risky direction in the group context.
Explanations have centered on group influences for increased riskiness and
are typically drawn from one of four major categories of explanation:
statistical, cognitive, interactive, and affective models (Vinokur, 1971b;
generally, see Brown, 1965; Kelley and Thibaut, 1968; Dion et al. 1970;
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3, 1971-entire issue).
Statistical models. The statistical model explains the risky shift in terms
of the decisional rules used in the group context. Less theoretically
satisfying than other models, the explained shift is analyzed only in terms
of consensus versus majority decision rules (see Zajonc et al., 1972).
Cognitive models. Two forms of explanation are often evident in the
cognitive model. First, the &dquo;information relevant to the task&dquo; hypothesis
postulates that group discussion adds new information (content) beyond
any interactive component (Kogan and Wallach, 1967; Pruitt and Teger,
1969; Vinokur, 1971 a). The other major cognitive explanation is based on
decision principles rooted in rational choice models (see Lee, 1971): the
subjective expected utility model is a predictor for risk-level preferences,
i.e., individuals do not feel more risky, but change because the value of
success is altered in group discussion, thereby making the shift rational
(Burnstein, et al., 1971; Cartwright, 1971; Vinokur, 1971 a).
Interactive models. These models are based more on sociological than
psychological explanations, claiming that shifts are due to interactions
within the group as they relate to problem-solving and the emergence of
leaders. Leadership theory, first purposed by Marquis (1962), hypothesizes
that high risk-takers are more persuasive in group discussion (see also
Wallach, Kogan, and Bem, 1962). One author suggests two subtheories of
leadership: leader confidence theory-Ss who are initially higher risk-takers
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are more confident, thus more influential; and &dquo;rhetoric of risk&dquo;
theory-risky language is more dramatic and persuasive (Pruitt, 1971a).
The other interactive hypothesis is based on group problem-solving. This
analogy holds that groups are better at solving problems than individuals
(Faust, 1959), and that group discussion is a vital element in the shift
(Rettig, 1966). Nevertheless, the interactive interpretation is not univer-
sally accepted, given indications that shifts may occur without group
discussion (see Pruitt, 1971 b).
Affectivc models. Most research on the risky shift phenomenon falls
within a category of affective models treating the effects that groups have
on individuals in the presence of others.
Diffusion-of-responsibility theory was the earliest of these explanations
for risk. The group decision reduces the subject’s anxiety about risk and
the possible negative consequences, thereby alleviating individual responsi-
bility for the decision and facilitating risky shifts (Kogan and Wallach,
1967). The emotional bonds encountered in a group situation are relevant
to this hypothesis; if those bonds are strong, a risky shift is likely to occur
(Teger and Pruitt, 1967).
Familiarization theory hypothesizes that group discussion is only a
method for the individual to become more acquainted with the informa-
tion, thus lowering uncertainty and increasing risk (Bateson, 1966;
Flanders and Thistlethwaite, 1967). This interpretation has been con-
tradicted by research findings and has been increasingly subject to
scholarly attack (Teger et al., 1970; Dion and Miller, 1971; Castore, 1972).
Value theory is the most general and widely supported of the various
theories of risk-taking behavior. Over the last ten years, value theory has
generally been confirmed as an explanation of the risky shift phenomenon,
and various subtheories have developed from the model. Roger Brown
(1965) first proposed the risk-as-value theory by showing that when risk
was the valued or admired choice, the subject generally saw himself as
more risky than others around him. When the individual moves into the
group environment, he finds others riskier than he, and thus shifts further
out on the risky dimension.
The strength of value theory is that it can account for cautious shifts as
well as risky ones, whereas the other affective theories can only account
for the risky shift. In value theory, if the cautious response is the more
valued one, the shift in the group context will move in that direction.
Stoner (1968) constructed a three-part hypothesis that has been
generally used in testing value theory. First, individuals make their own
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decision in a manner consistent with widely held values. Second,
individuals consider themselves more consistent (not necessarily risky)
with those values than others similar to themselves. Third, when group
discussion and decision-making shows the individual that others are more
consistent with those values than the individual’s own previous decision,
the subject will shift in the valued direction. If one valued a direction
different from the group shift, one would tend to resist such movement.
Although slightly different methodologies have been used in testing
value theory, the major studies have confirmed these basic hypotheses
(Lamm, Trommsdorff, and Kogan, 1970; Clark et al., 1971; Lamm,
Schaude, and Trommsdorff, 1971; Ferguson and Vidmar, 1971; Baron et
al., 1973). Additionally, Levinger and Schneider (1969) have examined
only pretest responses, while Jellison and Riskind (1970) were concerned
with the abilities of individuals and their level of risk. Even studies
attempting to test other affective hypotheses have found more evidence
for value theory (Teger and Pruitt, 1967; Wallach et al., 1968).
The Emerging Relevance of
Choice Shift Concepts
The risky shift phenomenon has generated over 300 research products
since the original work by Stoner (Myers, 1973). Yet the general reliance
on a single CDQ questionnaire has created a sense of overkill; indeed, the
basic concept of a CDQ is questionable. The subject in an experiment is
offering a willingness to take risks in a purely hypothetical situation.
Political decisions are not based solely on the riskiness of the decision-
maker, but often the perceived impact on the population being affected.
The risky shift measured in this way is only one element of choice-shift
behavior and of group effects on individuals (Walker, 1975).
Levinger and Schneider (1969) were the first to recognize that &dquo;choice
shift&dquo; was a more relevant conceptualization than &dquo;risky shift.&dquo; Yet their
references were limited to the possibilities of cautious, as well as risky,
shifts. Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) broadened the conceptualization of
choice shifts into attitude shifts on French students, and Myers and Bishop
(1970) used a similar method on race relations attitudes among American
students. In order to explain political choice shifts, such operationaliza-
tions are preferred over the CDQ-life situation items. Except for value
theory, however, all previous theories are limited to explanations of risk;
yet the other models may be redefined to test general choice shifts.
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The statistical model’s treatment of decision rules, for example, has
been applied experimentally on political policy attitudinal items. The
findings suggest greater shifts among majority rule groups over consensus
rule groups (Kirkpatrick and Robertson, 1976). The diffusion-of-responsi-
bility model suggests that anxiety reduction through group identification
or cohesiveness is the prime element in group shift. Other models, such as
those emphasizing leader confidence, based on sociological interaction
may be analyzed through various sociometric tests useful in measuring
interpersonal influence (Kerlinger, 1973). Since value theory is applicable
to general choice shifts as well as the risky shift, little redefinition is
necessary. However, the use of Likert-type items, applied first by
Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969), conforms more closely to a general choice
shift mode than does more traditional CDQ measurement. Further
examination of a more general polarization hypothesis has been suggested
recently by findings that the group decision is more extreme or polarized
than the mean of individual pretest positions (for a review see, Myers and
Lamm, forthcoming). Since most of the models are interrelated, experi-
mental treatments should begin to broaden their scope to include
interactive elements between the models-a general failure of previous
research efforts. Without such theoretical linkages, development of
political choice shift explanations will be excessively fragmentary.
Political Science Research on
Choice Shifts
Although small groups play a major role in political decision-making,
political science has largely ignored the effects of the group process on
choice shifts. Nonexperimental research has been generally oriented
toward either historical analysis or collegial court behavior. Historical
analyses, rich in process behavior, are necessarily confined to ex post facto
models and have little predictive ability. An oft-cited example is Janis’
Victims of Groupthink (1972), which suggests that group decisions in
foreign policy are often defective. In collegial court behavior, two
researchers have found that judges will shift to a more libertarian position
and are more likely to exercise judicial review while members of a group
(Walker and Main, 1973; Main and Walker, 1973). Other studies have
hinted at the effects of group behavior and the impact of identification
with groups on individual behavior (McWhirter, 1974; Raven, 1974).
Experimental applications of the choice shift in political science are
even more rare (see reviews by Kirkpatrick, 1975b, and Walker, 1975). In
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an attempt to revise the traditional CDQ to make it more applicable to
political decisions, Kirkpatrick et al. (1975) created new political CDQ
items and tested the effects of information and discussion on experimental
groups. Their findings emphasize the cautious shift as the prime change in
political group settings.
While the choice dilemma technique has dominated social-psychological
research on the choice shift, it has no proprietary rights to theory.
Successful substitute measures have appeared throughout the research
literature (e.g., substituting attitude scales-Moscovici and Zavalloni,
1969). Using such cues, Kirkpatrick and Robertson (1976) have created
non-CDQ items more directly relevant to policy issues. In a test of value
theory, the findings suggest that groups shift to more extreme or firm
positions when Ss recognize that others are not more neutral than
themselves.
ALTERNATIVE SEARCH AND
CHOICE SHIFT LINKAGES
The two fundamental decision processes of searching for aitematives
and shifting choices on the basis of group effects are complementary to
one another, yet there is no research which attempts to link these
processes. The strength of the choice shift paradigm is its focus on changes
in outcomes as a result of group effects influencing levels of certainty
about decisional consequences. The risky shift concept, for example, led
to findings emphasizing greater uncertainty in terms of decisional
consequences in group situations compared to individual choice; and,
similarly, the shift to caution involves greater certainty in terms of
decisional consequences in groups versus the individual. Choice shifts
therefore focus on the consequences of alternatives, yet the paradigm has
little to offer in terms of the search for alternatives. Indeed, the classic
experimental model of choice shifts includes the presentation of a single
alternative (and, implicitly, its obverse), along which individuals and
groups vary by levels of probability assigned to the certainty of outcomes.
On the other hand, the search literature tends to avoid a focus on
consequences and instead relies on concepts and constraints associated
with informational/alternative uncertainty reduction. Knowledge of alter-
native search behavior does not necessarily provide us with knowledge of
choice shifts associated with the various consequences of alternatives, even
though both processes may be dependent upon similar sets of individual
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and group effects. Informational variables, for example, play an important
role in the rather disparate theorizing about search behavior and choice
shift; however, the effects of such variables have never been examined
simultaneously. Similarly, other individual factors such as cognitive
complexity and motivational needs, as well as group effects such as
conformity and leadership, are relevant to both processes. While these two
processes are not mutually exclusive-indeed, some extreme alternatives
may have more or less agreed-upon consequences (i.e., they converge)-
Figure 1: A Framework for Political Decision-Making
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conceptual distinctions between them should facilitate linkages and enable
us to focus on both in the decision process. Either one viewed alone is
insufficient; even a rational-comprehensive search is theoretically irrelevant
if it cannot be linked to outcomes; and choice shifts, regardless of their
direction, have too often been isolated from a variety of available
alternatives. The rational search perspective has too often assumed that
consequences are known and that probabilities are agreed upon. In sum,
both processes involve important constraints on more rational models, and
the establishment of empirical linkages between the two is crucial if we are
to understand decision-making.
SUMMARY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The preceding theory and research offers cues to hypothesis-testing and
operationalization; most important, it suggests a framework for analyzing
political decisions applied to a variety of settings. This summary
framework, presented in Figure 1, is offered as a simplifying device and as
a translation mechanism to encourage movement from general bodies of
theory to specific operationalizations. While its categories are not always
mutually exclusive, and while it does not address a host of subtle and
highly complex effects discussed above, it treats the primary components
utilized in this investigation. Furthermore, the arrows depicting linkages
within and between search and shift processes should not detract from the
iterative nature of those processes.
The framework begins at the broadest level with a concern for
environmental factors. While political culture and the sociopolitical milieu
obviously form a backdrop for political decision-making, the environ-
mental component specifically addresses several constraints on decision-
making. These include (1) information-especially that about alternatives
and consequences-which varies in level of complexity, volume, sponta-
neity, source credibility, and costs for obtaining it; (2) organizational
characteristics, procedures, majority/consensus decision rules, and ac-
cepted modes for channeling information, including that from external
groups; and (3) situational constraints which vary across time and policy
arenas and which are characterized by varying levels of external group,
clientele, and constituency involvement.
These process-relevant environmental factors are mediated by both
individual and group constraints which are, in turn, mutually dependent.
Those factors which are primarily individual in origin or perceiver-deter-
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mined include the motives or functional needs of decision-makers and
their cognitive characteristics. The latter include a variety of heuristic rules
employed, the level of cognitive complexity, and the extent of predeci-
sional dissonance. These individual factors are tempered by a variety of
group constraints, including prevailing group values, levels of consensus,
diffusion and familiarization processes, interpersonal ties and group
cohesion, and leadership patterns. Both individual and group factors filter
environmental constraints and bear directly on the search process and,
either directly or indirectly, influence the processes of choice shift.
Although some individual and group constraints may be more relevant for
the search process than for the shift process, each set of elements requires
operationalization, empirical testing, and comparative examination for
effects.
In addition, while the search process provides outputs in the form of
alternatives (or nonalternatives) which become focal points for the
perception/evaluation of consequences during potential shift processes, the
nature of choice shifts will also directly reflect individual and group
factors. Under conditions where search is weak or practically nonexistent,
such antecedent factors may assume a primary role at the shift stage.
Lkewise, there may be conditions where search is complex, comprehen-
sive, and characterized by multiple outputs, but where little consequence
activity or individual-group change occurs. And as we suggested earlier, the
search and shift effects may converge so as to be nearly indistinguishable
in certain circumstances.
The search process itself includes various &dquo;actors&dquo; who apply various
&dquo;rules&dquo; to information &dquo;objects.&dquo; These actors may evoke information
internally and on an individual basis, or externally on a group or
significant-other basis, and they do so through a variety of &dquo;evocation
rules&dquo; for attending, selecting, combining, and inferring information (Warr
and Knapper, 1968) about &dquo;evocation objects.&dquo; These evocation or
information objects include the general .problem (definition, goals,
agenda-setting), the problem environment, alternatives and consequences,
and prior choices brought to attention through feedback mechanisms.
Alternatives which vary in their content, volume, and complexity then
result from various environmental, individual, and group constraints
influencing evocators applying evocation rules to evocation objects.
The shift process involves actors who develop orientations to prior and
subsequent consequences for the range of alternatives provided by the
search process. These actors exhibit varying degrees and directions of
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movement from an individual to group decision. The shifts may be
dependent upon various types of alternatives provided by the search
process, as well as a range of individual and group constraints. The final
group choice, as partially determined by decision rules filtered by other
antecedent factors, constitutes an outcome. These outcomes have policy
relevance (or may be policy) for any unit of analysis under examination
(e.g., boards and councils) and for the level of the political system at
which they occur. Their content may fall within several policy dimen-
sions-e.g., routine or innovative policy, system maintenance, or lifestyle
values (Williams, 1961; Kirkpatrick and Morgan, 1971), or distributive,
regulatory, or redistributive policies (Lowi, 1964). While there is a variety
of alternative conceptualizations for policy dimensions (see Kirkpatrick,
1970), these are suggestive of policy types by content and obviously
reflect situational conditions. In addition, they may be distinguished by a
process typology which differentiates incremental and nonincremental
decisions. Such outcome types may be associated with different search and
shift processes, and several important and subtle relationships may appear
as effects are examined from multivariate and experimental perspectives.
Unlike most other decisional frameworks, this model incorporates a
variety of environmental, individual, and group factors in the context of
social-psychological theory; it specifically addresses both the search and
shift process; it attends to multivariate effects which have heretofore been
unexamined for either the search or shift component; and it is specifically
outcome-oriented, making further distinctions between types of decisions.
Moreover, the framework components are sufficiently rooted in existing
research so as to enable operationalization and empirical testing.
RESEARCH AGENDA
Given the rich, albeit disparate, theoretical and empirical efforts
relevant to political decision-making, there is reason for optimism about
substantive developments in future research. The theoretical discussion
and schema offered above provide one way for potentially integrating
decision-making research from several disciplines and for reducing the gap
between process and outcome concerns. There is a possibility, however,
that decision-making scholars will remain firmly entrenched in an
excessively compartmentalized field of inquiry, thereby precluding the
development of a cumulative theoretical and empirical research tradition.
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In this regard, we offer several suggestions for future students of
decision-making.
First, while it is necessary to engage in alternative theoretical
treatments of political choice, it is essential that these efforts be
fundamentally integrative in nature. Moreover, the incorporation of
findings from several disciplines into one’s own is only a necessary, but not
a sufficient, condition for theoretical integration. Rather, we should
concern ourselves with synthesizing both the theoretical and empirical
content of decision-making research.
Second, it is essential for students of decision-making to escape the
limitations of single research modes. One should not be scientifically
comfortable with findings generated in only one type of research setting
(e.g., laboratory, field observations). It is remarkable that a path-breaking
effort such as Barber’s (1966) has been met with so little interest by the
political science community. Similar types of inquiry are necessary to
move beyond mere analogy between laboratory and field study findings to
actual investigations of the same or similar phenomena in different
research settings.
A third suggestion derives from the second-that political scientists
modify what appears to be the dominant disciplinary view of research
validity. Students of politics appear to be excessively concerned with
external validity or generalizability of research results, and hence have
given special emphasis to field studies and research involving large-scale
random sampling procedures. As a consequence, experimental research
remains in relative infancy in political science, including the decision-
making field. Indeed, small group analysis in controlled laboratory settings
offers some distinct advantages over other approaches (Weick, 1965;
Dyson, 1975). First, it enables one to observe decision-relevant behavior
which is generally not open to view in natural settings. Second, the
expel imental research mode forces the analyst to be explicit conceptually,
a shortcoming of many decision-making frameworks (see Rosenau, 1967).
Most important, experimentation is virtually unparalleled as a means for
insuring internal validity and testing causal relationships in a manner which
allows for considerable confidence with respect to falsifying or supporting
particular theoretical propositions (Hempel, 1966: 19-22). Without estab-
lishing internal validity in decision-making research, the ability to
generalize to other settings or populations is fruitless (Campbell and
Stanley, 1966: 5).
Furthermore, in the physical sciences, external validity is established
through replication much more often than through large-scale random
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sampling. Although the more exact sciences may indeed have less
difficulty associated with wide-ranging variation in units of analysis, the
principle of establishing the generalizability of observed relationships
through repeated testing under slightly altered research conditions is a
sound guide for the social sciences.
Finally, it seems prudent to anchor our decision-making research
empirically. This rather obvious assertion reflects our reading of available
theoretical frameworks. Too often, decision-making scholars have provided
characterizations of decision-making which do not facilitate practical
operationalization of the component concepts. Throughout our discussion,
we have sought to indicate empirical source materials relevant to choice
processes. If microanalytic constructs of political decision-making are to
survive, they must meet the test of research.
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